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the earliest authority for the events, and *may* be right as against Timæus and the other sources of the later biographers. As E. Meyer says, the disagreement between Timæus and Timonides about the name of Dion's son may indicate that he had two sons. Or, even if the biographers are right, Plato may not have been properly informed when he wrote the letter.

Mr. Richards's own guess that 7 and 8 are "prize essays" does not approve itself to me. Isocrates set his pupils to this kind of exercise; the early Academy, from all we know of it, is unlikely to have cultivated the art. And the egotism Mr. Richards finds in the *Letters* (if genuine) is nothing to the egotism which Plato suffered from if he really set his pupils to write prize essays on "*My Sicilian Policy*".

A. E. TAYLOR.

A New Law of Thought and Its Logical Bearings. By E. E. CONSTANCE JONES. With a Preface by Prof. Stout. "Girton College Studies," No. 4. Cambridge University Press, 1911. Pp. vii, 75.

MISS JONES has made a great discovery. She has discovered the Law of Significant Assertion, and also that it does not find a place among those which Logic enumerates as the self-evident Laws of Thought. In other words she has discovered that Formal Logic has hitherto ignored significant assertion and that one (at least) of its 'laws of thought' is *not* a significant assertion. This again may plainly lead on to the discovery that Formal Logic has nothing to do with significant assertion, and in fact *means nothing*. This curious predicament has long been a *secret de polichinelle* in the inner circle of pragmatist logicians, and has even been more or less plainly hinted at in print. But its public proclamation may precipitate a crisis. It is to be feared that it may so enrage logicians that their proscription of the heretics who want a logic which *is* concerned with significant assertion will spare neither age nor sex. Miss Jones therefore will need the support of all who want logic to mean something. It will be well however to begin by explaining what precisely her innocent-looking little book has achieved.

Of all the 'self-evident' 'Laws of Thought' that of 'Identity' is the most obviously unmeaning. That significant assertion *never* takes the form '*A is A*' nor predicates a subject of itself, is as clear as daylight and could not but impress itself even on the most orthodox logicians. In significant assertion the predicate is always different from the subject. If therefore it is taken as a necessary truth that there must be a 'Law of Identity,' Hegelism was surely entitled to protest that the 'identities' (so-called) which occur in judging must always contain differences. But this protest is only the beginning of an attempt to make logic mean something. For

it left the precise relation of the 'differences' to the 'identities' as obscure as ever. It is at this point, therefore, that Miss Jones begins her analysis. She assumes that 'every name or term has two aspects, the denotational or extensional and the intensional or connotational' (p. 9), that the "denotation of a term means the sphere of its application—the things to which the term applies," and the intension "the properties of the things to which the term applies" (p. 71), and that 'identity' is to be confined to denotational oneness (p. 10). It is inferred thence that every (categorical affirmative) proposition asserts 'identity of denotation in diversity of intension' (p. 28). That is, the denotation of S and P in *S is P* is the same, though *S-ness* and *P-ness* of course remain diverse. In other words, though S and P are conceptually distinct, they yet both *apply* to the same *thing*, and it is this identity of reference amid diversity of (dictionary-) meaning which is the meaning, and gives the meaning, of all judgments. Thus while it is *not* asserted that as such and in the abstract S and P are the same, it *is* asserted that for the purpose in hand and in the case in point this connexion may be effected, because both S and P apply to something which in fact combines these diverse qualities.

Miss Jones has worked out the formal technicalities of this formula with admirable fullness, though she has hardly drawn sufficient attention to its importance for the general theory of knowledge. To some extent however this deficiency is made up by the brief, but very lucid, preface with which Prof. Stout introduces the book. Prof. Stout prefers to consider Miss Jones's formula not as a law of 'identity,' but as a law of significant assertion and as logically prior to the laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle, and it would seem that his view was preferable in this respect. On the other hand it looks like inadequate appreciation of Miss Jones's service to Logic to declare that this "lies not so much in the mere enunciation of the Law of Significant Assertion" as in her application of it to special problems (p. vi). Surely to have laid down the conditions of Significant Assertion is an achievement which may eventually redeem Logic from the reproach of being meaningless.

Its importance is concealed from Prof. Stout by his failure to perceive that it is not only "*a* fundamental law of Thought," but *the* most primary and indispensable law of all, and moreover utterly incompatible with the 'Law of Identity' as hitherto understood. Prof. Stout thinks that "the best writers on Logic tend to interpret this law as expressing the immutability of truth . . . it means that the truth of a proposition is unaffected by variation of time, place and circumstances, or of the minds which apprehend it". But whether it or the Law of Significant Assertion is "the most appropriate interpretation of the cryptic formula '*A is A*' is of quite subordinate interest". Here it seems impossible to agree. If an assertion to be significant has to assert diversity of intensions amid

identity of denotation, any logical principle which ignores this requirement becomes strictly meaningless. It may be shown moreover that this is just what the 'Law of Identity' does.

It follows from the Law of Significant Assertion that every judgment must 'have' both 'denotation' and 'connotation'. If it has no 'denotation,' *i.e.*, until it is *applied*, it means nothing. The unapplied formula, or mere connexion of intensions, is a mere form of words, which as yet is unmeaning. It is impossible to say whether it is true or false that 'it is hot,' until a judgment is actually made and the phrase is actually applied on some particular occasion. When it is so applied, it is asserted that the subject and the predicate terms, the (dictionary-) meanings of which are diverse, are *in this case* applicable to the same thing or situation. This application gives, and is, the real meaning of the judgment; or, otherwise, turns the form of words into a judgment. The meaning of '*S is P*' thus is strictly *ad hoc*, and depends on its *application to a particular case* which is both '*S*' and '*P*'. Hence to have a meaning (and *a fortiori* to be true) a proposition must be *applied*. But to apply it is to use it, and thus the formula manifestly develops into Mr. Sidgwick's definition of the pragmatic principle, *viz.*, that *meaning depends on application*. It yields indeed the briefest, neatest, and completest proof of pragmatism that has yet been devised. For if *to have a meaning* every proposition must be applied and *used*, it is clear that it cannot be *true* unless it is used, and that all '*truth*' must be useful. If use is necessary to constitute *meaning*, it is *a fortiori* necessary to constitute *truth*. Pragmatism, as Capt. H. V. Knox has pointed out (*Quarterly Review*, No. 409, pp. 397-405), should be conceived not as a doctrine about the meaning of '*truth*,' but more profoundly, as a demand for a meaning, which rationalism has until now refused to consider. All truth is useful only derivatively and because useless allegations are devoid of meaning—in any but a dictionary-sense, which need never be the actual sense. This formula, however (quite rightly), does not carry us beyond truth-claim. It tells us under what conditions *S is P* can convey a meaning, *viz.*, if it is used in a particular situation. It does not tell us anything more, whether *e.g.*, the identification holds, *i.e.*, whether '*S*' truly is '*P*' in this case. A guarantee of meaning is not *ipso facto* a guarantee of truth. We are given the correct *formal* analysis of significant judgment, without a pretence that anything is thereby prejudged about the real truth of the truth-claim, and so the question of real truth is left to be attested by something more conclusive than the mere form of the allegation. We are thus enabled to distinguish the prior problem of meaning from the subsequent testing of a truth-claim, which may of course always turn out to be erroneous.

Now it is over this prior problem that Miss Jones's Law challenges Formal Logic. It insists that application to a particular case is essential to the existence of meaning. This is to say that

the time, place, context, personalities, and circumstances of a judgment are essential to its conveying a meaning. Now this $\epsilon\lambda\eta$ of any actual application is precisely what 'the best logicians' seem to have determined shall be abstracted from by their version of the 'Law of Identity'. 'A is A' is taken to mean the 'eternity of truth,' 'once true always true,' *i.e.*, that when once anything has been (successfully) called A it shall be A henceforth for ever more, without regard to changes of time, place, context and circumstances, and no objections based on these shall be listened to.

Now this is an attempt to *avoid* the risks of application to a particular case and the liability to error and misuse which is inherent in significant assertion. It is a demand for an *a priori* guarantee of the 'truth' of a formula, and a refusal to allow the question of its truth or falsity to be determined by its actual working in each case. The truth of the universal is rendered independent of the truth of its particular exemplifications. It is all very clever and a very pretty dodge. It dodges the vital question whether a 'universal' that has been found useful once in analysing a situation will be equally successful the next time any one chooses to employ it. It simply begs the question whether when we want to argue from one 'case' to another *we are right in ignoring the differences* between $A^1(+ \dots)$ and $A^2(+ \dots)$, which may really turn out to be for the purpose in hand a 'case' of 'B' or 'C,' by pointing triumphantly to the 'eternal' 'identity' of abstract 'A,' and so burkes the question whether in this case (so-called) 'A' is *really* 'A'. And though by doing these things it wholly parts company with actual thinking, it is very comforting to the craving for dogmatic certainty.

But unfortunately it is in flat contradiction with the Law of Significant Assertion.

This is where it slips up. The Eternity of Truth is only maintained at the cost of abstracting from the particular case as such. It is truth, not only without application, but to the exclusion of application. For, in fact, wherever there is application there is risk of error. For it is *never* self-evident that *A is A* in any particular 'case'. For the 'A' has always changed from the last time it was 'identified,' and there is always a question whether this change is not relevant, and fatal to the proposed application. Hence the only way to maintain the 'self-evidence' of '*A is A*' is *never* to apply it. Thus the declarations that until there is application there is no meaning, and that though there is meaning it may be false, are *fatal* to the Eternity of Truth. It is seen to be literally a meaningless 'law,' and it aims at the subversion *a priori* of the risk of error which is involved in all meaningful assertion. Either it, therefore, or the Law of Significant Assertion must go, and Prof. Stout's irenic (or ironical) suggestion that they might toss up as to which should inherit the title of the meaningless 'Law of Identity' is no solution at all. To accept

Miss Jones's law is to insist that before there is 'logic' there must be thought, before there is thought there must be meaning, before there is meaning there must be application, before there is application there must be purpose and prospective use. It condemns therefore as meaningless every form of 'logic' which tries to abstract from the use of thought. On the other hand to cling to the interpretation of the 'best logicians' is to turn all these positions upside down.

But how far, it may be asked, have our 'best logicians' really intended all this? Have they really meant to base their 'science' on an abstraction from meaning? That no doubt is what its character actually is, and it is the explanation of its scientific sterility. But were they fully aware of what they were doing, of what their craving for 'eternal,' indisputable and self-evident truths (won without tears and without labour) was leading them on to? It is certainly hard to believe this was consciously intended by any of our 'best logicians,' and it will be more charitable not to believe it until they have openly and unequivocally asserted that their 'logic' rests on 'laws of thought' which have no meaning and prohibit all meaning, and have explicitly upheld their contention against a better analysis of thought. But an *éclaircissement* is certainly required, and Miss Jones's book ought to provide a welcome occasion for it.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

Un Romantisme Utilitaire ; Étude sur le Mouvement Pragmatiste. Le Pragmatisme chez Nietzsche et chez Poincaré. By RENÉ BERTHELOT. Paris, Alcan, 1911. Pp. 416.

M. RENÉ BERTHELOT has the instincts of a historian. His notion of philosophising is to trace the history of an idea and to mention all the 'influences' his erudition can bring into 'logical connexion' with it. That is, he does not approach it in a biographical way and track it to its fountain-head in the soul of the man who first created it, but by way of meditating on what seem to him the logical connexions it has with all and sundry other ideas that were published before it. And as his erudition is great the poor little idea inquired into soon gets crowded out, and we usually lose our interest in it long before we get to it. The fundamental assumption of this way of writing the history of thought is of course that no thinker can ever as such have done anything but read books and write books about the books he has read—indeed it is censured as an inconsistency for those who believe in action to write at all! (p. 92). The *men* behind the books therefore are invisible to M. Berthelot. He never suspects any one of a capacity of doing such things as observing and thinking for himself in a spontaneous, ignorant and original way. The short way therefore to take with every 'new' doctrine is to decompose it into materials taken from